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ABSTRACT 
Discriminatory practices in recruitment and hiring are an ongoing 
issue that is a concern not just for workplace relations, but also for 
wider understandings of economic justice and inequality. The 
ability to get and keep a job is a key aspect of participating in 
society and sustaining livelihoods. Yet the way decisions are made 
on who is eligible for jobs,  and why, are rapidly changing with the 
advent and growth in uptake of automated hiring systems (AHSs) 
powered by data-driven tools. Evidence of the extent of this uptake 
around the globe is scarce, but a recent report estimated that 98% 
of Fortune 500 companies use Applicant Tracking Systems of some 
kind in their hiring process, a trend driven by perceived efficiency 
measures and cost-savings. Key concerns about such AHSs include 
the lack of transparency and potential limitation of access to jobs 
for specific profiles. In relation to the latter, however, several of 
these AHSs claim to detect and mitigate discriminatory practices 
against protected groups and promote diversity and inclusion at 
work. Yet whilst these tools have a growing user-base around the 
world, such claims of ‘bias mitigation’ are rarely scrutinised and 
evaluated, and when done so, have almost exclusively been from a 
US socio-legal perspective.  
In this paper, we introduce a perspective outside the US by 
critically examining how three prominent automated hiring systems 
(AHSs) in regular use in the UK, HireVue, Pymetrics and Applied, 
understand and attempt to mitigate bias and discrimination.  These 
systems have been chosen as they explicitly claim to address issues 
of discrimination in hiring and, unlike many of their competitors, 
provide some information about how their systems work that can 
inform an analysis. Using publicly available documents, we 
describe how their tools are designed, validated and audited for 
bias, highlighting assumptions and limitations, before situating 
these in the socio-legal context of the UK. The UK has a very 
different legal background to the US in terms not only of hiring and 
equality law, but also in terms of data protection (DP) law. We 
argue that this might be important for addressing concerns about 
transparency and could mean a challenge to building  bias 
mitigation into AHSs definitively capable of meeting EU legal 
standards. This is significant as these AHSs, especially those 
developed in the US, may obscure rather than improve systemic 
discrimination in the workplace.   
CCS CONCEPTS 
• Social and professional topics → Socio-technical systems; 
Systems analysis and design • Applied computing → Sociology; 
Law 
KEYWORDS 
Socio-technical systems, automated hiring, algorithmic decision-
making, fairness, discrimination, GDPR, social justice 
ACM Reference format: 
FirstName Surname, FirstName Surname and FirstName Surname. 2020. 
Insert Your Title Here: Insert Subtitle Here. In Proceedings of ACM FAT* 
conference (FAT*’2020). ACM, Barcelona, Spain, 2 pages. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1234567890 
1 Introduction 
The use of data systems and automated decision-making as a way 
to monitor, allocate, assess and manage labour is a growing feature 
of the contemporary workplace. Of increasing significance is the 
way Human Resources, and hiring practices in particular, are being 
transformed through various forms of automation and the use of 
data-driven technologies which we will collectively term 
Automated Hiring Systems (AHSs) [11,38,40]. Whilst there is a 
lack of data on the global uptake of such technologies, a recent 
report estimated that 98% of Fortune 500 companies use Applicant 
Tracking Systems of some kind in their hiring process [56]. The so-
called ‘hiring funnel’ [11] consists of sourcing, screening, 
interviewing, and selection/rejection as a set of progressive filtering 
stages to identify and recruit the most suitable candidates. Each of 
these stages are undergoing forms of automation, as part of not only 
perceived efficiency measures and cost-savings that data-driven 
technologies afford, but also as a means to detect and mitigate 
discriminatory practices against protected groups and promoting 
diversity and inclusion at work [11]. Hiring platforms such as 
PeopleStrong or TribePad implement basic measures to mitigate 
human unconscious biases, such as anonymisation of candidates, 
while other platforms such as HireVue, Pymetrics and Applied 
claim to specifically tackle the problem of discrimination in hiring. 
Yet the basis upon which such claims are made is rarely scrutinised 
and evaluated. While algorithmic bias generally and in employment 
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law specifically [10] has had extensive investigation in the FAT* 
community, literature on bias mitigation in AHSs is at an early 
stage and so far primarily focused on the US context of employment 
both socially and legally [2,11,37]. We know much less about how 
this phenomena is developing in Europe [5]. This is the first 
scholarly attempt to consider the question of how satisfactorily bias 
and discrimination might be mitigated in AHSs within the UK 
context. 
 
In this paper we start by outlining how data-driven technologies are 
transforming hiring practices, before turning to focus on three 
AHSs widely in use in the UK which make claims to deal with bias 
and whose claims could be evaluated using publicly available 
materials such as company white papers and reports, patents, 
marketing resources, seminars and, in one case,  source code. 
Access to further information relating to code, data sets, features 
design, trained models, or even the application user interface was 
not possible, and will often vary depending on client. Based on this 
publicly available material that outline their technological and 
procedural frameworks, we examine how these products implement 
bias discovery and mitigation. In doing so, and in building on recent 
work in this area [3,11,37,40] we explore the assumptions made 
about the meaning of bias and discrimination in hiring practices 
embedded within these tools. The three prominent systems we 
examined were Pymetrics, HireVue and Applied. For each of these, 
we outline the design of the tool, focusing on how bias in hiring is 
addressed. The first two of these come from the US, and the third, 
Applied, from the UK, for comparative purposes. Other UK 
systems were considered but either made no claims as to debiasing, 
or did not make available sufficient public material to analyse. 
Although not rigorously addressed, this gap, either in 
implementation of debiasing, or its disclosure, is in itself we feel a 
significant finding deserving further research. 
 
Next we briefly discuss the background to UK and EU equality law 
in the context of employment. Importantly, we raise the  point that 
in the EU, all natural persons whose personal data is processed are 
given data rights, including rights to transparency and protection 
against power imbalance, which may be as useful in combating bias 
in AHSs as employment equality rights; these data protection (DP) 
rights, ensconced in the EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), are not found in omnibus fashion in the US and thus have 
largely not been analysed in the US hiring algorithm literature.  
 
In analysing these systems, we started from the premise that there 
is no singular or unified way of interpreting the meaning of 
discrimination, or how it might feature in hiring practices, nor is 
there consensus on any computational criteria for how “bias” 
should be  defined, made explicit, or mitigated [18,35,37,39,48]. 
Ongoing analysis point out issues such as the unsuitability of maths 
to capture the full meaning of social concepts such as fairness, 
especially in a general sense, or the risk of technological 
solutionism [42]. Even when considering one stastistical definition 
for bias such as the error rate balance amongst groups, the 
understanding and implication of that approach radically varies 
with the context and the consequential decisions that are driven by 
the algorithmic output [23]. Also, all sociotechnical systems, even 
when designed to mitigate biases, are designed with use cases in 
mind that may not hold in all scenarios [42]. Moreover, fairness can 
be procedural, as in the equal treatment of individuals, or 
substantive, as in the equal impact on groups [10], what is also 
referred to as opportunity-based vs. outcome-based notions of bias. 
These do not necessarily align and may actually be contradictory 
[31].  
 
We conclude by arguing that, while common practices  may be 
emerging to mitigate bias in AHSs built in the US, these are 
inevitably likely to reflect US legal and societal conceptions of bias 
and discrimination, and yet are exported wholesale as products to 
UK and other markets beyond the US. If this mismatch is not 
explicitly disclosed and analysed,  there is a patent danger that 
inappropriate US-centric values and laws relating to bias in hiring 
(and more generally in society) may be exported to UK workplaces. 
Data protection rights, such as the alleged “right to an explanation” 
may by contrast not be implemented, potentially rendering useless 
the rights of candidates. What is more, while biased workplace 
hiring practices in traditional modes of hiring may at least to some 
extent be evident, and combatted in traditional ways by unions, 
strategic litigation and regulators, there are severe dangers that such 
biases buried within “black box” AHSs may not be manifestly 
obvious and so remain unchallenged.  As AHSs become ever more 
popular, especially in sectors which are precarious, such as retail 
and the gig economy where prospective employees (or contractors) 
may have little economic power or knowledge of rights [2,11], this 
is, we argue, a serious problem.  
2 The data-driven hiring funnel 
The automation of hiring is an important part of the broader 
discussion on the future of work, subject to a range of ethical 
concerns and issues of fairness across the different stages of the 
hiring funnel, from sourcing to screening to interviewing to 
selection [11].  At each of these stages, the increasing use of data 
to automate or partially automate the process is significantly 
changing the way decisions are made on who is eligible for jobs,  
and why. Recommender engines based on hybrid collaborative 
filtering methods are used to capture user (both job seekers and 
recruiters) preferences; tools are used to filter candidates and 
identify the most promising candidates; automated skills tests and 
video interviews evaluate candidates; and analytics dashboards are 
used to select candidates and generate ad hoc job offers [40]. Data 
is collected from a range of sources and can be self-reported by the 
candidate in the form of unstructured documents such as resumés 
or as structured professional network profiles or online application 
forms. Often this information will be extended and/or scored 
through additional sources of information and assessment tests.  
 
Central to the hiring process, only made more salient with 
automation, is the goal of hiring for ‘fit’ with an organisation, a 
criterion that leverages the employer significant discretion and may 
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only be useful if an employer can make an accurate determination 
of such a fit [3]. The algorithmic specification of such a fit often 
relies on abstracting candidate profiles in relation to historical data 
of the company and/or top performers for specific roles. That is, at 
each stage of the hiring process, tools are designed around a set of 
variables, optimized for a particular criteria as to who might 
constitute an appropriate and ‘good’ employee. Deciding on such a 
criteria has long been imbued with the potential for discriminatory 
practices, and the aim here is not to suggest that those practices 
have only emerged with the introduction of data-driven tools nor is 
it to further the construct of a (false) binary between human vs. 
automated decision-making. Rather, in line with Ajunwa [3], we 
see value in addressing issues that such tools have made salient 
with the understanding that technologies are the product of human 
action and that, as Wajcman puts it, “histories of discrimination live 
on in digital platforms and become part of the logic of everyday 
algorithmic systems.” [51].   
 
At the same time, the turn to AHSs is significant also for the 
potential scale of impact, the difficulty with interrogating decision-
making, increasing information asymmetry between labour and 
management, the standardisation of techniques, the obfuscation of 
accountability, and the veneer of objectivity that such technologies 
often afford employers, despite evidence of discrimination at each 
stage of the data-driven hiring funnel. For instance, when sourcing, 
specific groups have been found excluded from viewing job ads 
based on age [26] or gender [8]. Masculine gendered language in 
job descriptions can discourage women to apply for certain type of 
jobs [21] whilst language used by candidates has been 
demonstrated to be a proxy for social class that impact on the 
chances of being selected for an interview [45]. As such, screening 
of candidates based on collaborative filtering can perpetuate 
existing discriminatory practices [11]. Even when a 
recommendation engine is generally not discriminating against 
women, some job titles and rank results can place men in better 
positions [14]. Automated interviews, including the use of speech 
and facial recognition software, has been shown to perform poorly, 
particularly with regards to women of colour [11,12]. Moreover, 
using ‘cultural fit’ as part of the selection criterion has been shown 
to lead to exclusive hiring practices, and is now outlawed by some 
companies as part of an effort to decrease unconscious bias [3].  
These findings are part of a broader debate dedicated to outlining 
the way data-driven technologies systematically introduce and 
entrench forms of discrimination and social and economic 
inequality [6,33,34,39,54]. 
 
This role that AHSs come to play in entrenching and furthering the 
information asymmetry between labour and management inherent 
in the hiring process changes the terms of control in the workplace; 
what Ajunwa [1] refers to as ‘platform authoritarianism’ in which 
employers gain penetrating new insights into current or potential 
employees, but the latter have no room to negotiate. Similarly, 
Moore [32] argues that the on-going quantification of the 
workplace comes to discipline workers as they continuously seek 
 
1 https://www.pymetrics.com/  
to adapt to the needs of the technologies in place to assess them in 
a process of ‘self-quantification’. Importantly, who might be best 
positioned to adapt to such measures and who is likely to be 
excluded rarely forms part of approaches to bias mitigation. 
Instead, the focus of mitigation tends to be on the technicalities of 
the model, at the point of the interface, situating the relationship 
between discrimination and inequality within the confines of 
‘unconscious bias’.  
 
Of course, asking providers of AHSs to attend to the dynamics of 
power in labour relations and society more broadly might seem 
unnecessarily burdensome, but by not recognising the broader 
functions of automation in shaping those dynamics when 
considering forms of bias mitigation, we run the risk of neutralising 
challenges in a way that actively facilitates discrimination and 
inequality under a banner of fairness [16,20,25]. This is particularly 
important as these companies are part of standardising not only 
managerial techniques [2], but also how we should both understand 
and ‘solve’ the problem of discrimination in hiring, within a 
potentially global market.  
3. Technological bias auditing and mitigation in 
hiring  
The data-driven hiring funnel therefore demands attention and 
scrutiny, particularly in relation to issues of discrimination and 
rights. This is especially pertinent as a number of AHSs specifically 
claim to address bias and discrimination in hiring, and seek to do 
so across organisational and national contexts. The claim is that 
automation reduces hirer bias, replacing messy human decisions 
with a neutral technical process [2]. In this section, we introduce 
three such software systems that specifically address the issue of 
bias in hiring. These AHSs were selected as they are known to be 
used in the UK, and, unlike many of their competitors, there is 
publicly available information to inform an evaluation of their 
approach. We base this evaluation on what documents are available 
through their websites and registered patents. The complete model 
or design of the tool, or an outline of specific data sources, have not 
been available to us for auditing and will vary depending on the 
client.  
3.1 Pymetrics 
Pymetrics is a vendor of hiring technology that performs a pre-
employment assessment of candidates with games tests that are 
based on neuroscience research1. By analysing how participants 
behave with these games, the software generates metrics of 
cognitive, social and emotional traits. The profile is evaluated with 
a statistical model trained on the game results of top performers in 
each role so that the model can calculate a score and categorize the 
candidate as out-of-group and in-group [36]. This fit-to-role score 
is an aggregation of the scores of the individual tests. To create a 
description of optimal traits values for a professional role, the 
system uses an unsupervised learning clustering algorithm to 
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identify representative scores of traits for the reference workers. 
For instance, according to Pymetrics [19], one of the desired 
characteristics of the best performing software developers are 
‘delayed gratification’ and ‘learning’, that are two of the 
characteristics of a person that the software can measure (see Figure 
1). A person with a good score in these characteristics is more likely 
to fit in the position.  
 
 
Figure 1 Pymetrics software engineer profile of traits 
Pymetrics features bias mitigation in candidate assessment based 
on the game design that is intented to avoid score correlation with 
protected groups and be agnostic with respect to non-verbal 
communication and culture [19]. To evaluate the fairness of each 
game score and of the fit-to-role score, Pymetrics performs 
statistical tests to compare both the individual and aggregated 
scores with respect to candidates grouped by age, gender and 
ethnicity.  Since each game produces one to ten metrics, each one 
of those metrics is analysed to check for negative impact on 
protected groups scores.  
 
The Pymetrics’s US patent [36] reports detailed statistical test 
results of multiple group comparison. The worker and candidate 
data used for the test corresponds to several Pymetrics customers. 
The impact of age was analysed by grouping candidates in four age 
groups (≤ 29; 30-34; 35-39; and ≥ 40), the impact on gender was 
evaluated considering binary gender classes (male; female) and the 
impact of race considered eight categories (Asian, Black, Hispanic, 
Middle Eastern, Native American, White, other, and mixed race). 
The multivariate ANOVA and Hotelling's T-squared tests 
concluded that for each game none of the tasks showed significant 
differences by ethnic group and a subset of the tasks showed 
different scores based on age and gender. When comparing the final 
score that assesses the suitability of a person for a position, the 
multivariate statistical analyses concluded that there were no 
differences, statistical bias, between samples groups by age 
(p>0.05), gender (p>0.05) and race (p>>0.1).  
 
Pymetrics developed a specific tool, audit-AI, to perform this 
auditing and released it as open source software2. The software also 
 
2 https://github.com/pymetrics/audit-ai  
3 https://www.hirevue.com/  
performs US regulatory compliance checks to comply to fair 
standard treatment of all protected groups indicated on the Uniform 
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) [46]. The EEOC 
requires that the ratio of the proportion of pass rates, selection of 
candidates in this context, of the highest-passing and lowest-
passing demographic categories has to follow the 4/5ths rule, 
meaning the ratio comparing the two extreme cases cannot be 
smaller than 0.80. For example, if there are 1,000 candidates who 
were hired and they belong to three groups, A, B and C, with 
passing frequency of 350, 320 and 330 respectively, the highest and 
lowest passing groups are A and B and, so the bias ratio is 320/350, 
or 0.91. Since this ratio is greater than 0.80 the selection procedure 
meets the legal requirements of the EEOC.   
3.2 HireVue 
HireVue3 is a product to automate the pre-interview assessment of 
candidates from a pool. It performs automated video interview and 
games to profile candidates. The games and questions are designed 
based on Industrial Organization psychology research. The tool 
extracts three types of indicator data from applicants categorical, 
audio and video [44]. HireVue promises to eliminate human biases 
in the assessment of candidates whilst simultaneously finding the 
subset of candidates that are most likely to be successful in a job by 
comparing them to employees already performing that job. 
Therefore, the software automates the screening of candidates by 
directly selecting them for a later human interview. In contrast to 
information provided by Pymetrcis, HireVue provides more 
general information about what precise features are extracted from 
candidates and the specific statistical definition of bias.  
 
Bias detection is performed by measuring demographic parity as 
defined by the US EEOC. To mitigate bias, HireVue has two 
strategies: 
 
The first strategy consists of the removal of indicators that have an 
adverse impact on protected groups based on previous knowledge. 
As described in the website documentation [24] and patent [44], the 
abstract process first defines performance indicators and questions 
to elicit responses that can be measured and related to job 
performance. Indicators can include not only what the candidate 
says but also how they say it by extracting audio features such as 
pitch or duration. Then a model is trained to learn how to predict 
the suitability of the candidate from all these indicators. The bias 
mitigation consists of evaluating the adverse impact on protected 
groups by detecting violation of the 4/5ths rule. Features that cause 
biased results are removed and the models are re-trained and re-
evaluated until bias is not detected. As an illustrative example, 
HireVue presents the case of speaking slowly as a characteristic of 
the top performers in a technical support role that also is more 
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common in men4. Testing the tool should reveal this correlation so 
that the feature will be suppressed from the model input 5 .  
Alternatively, according to the patent [44], the bias discovering 
process can consist of applying clustering methods to detect 
protected groups in the feature space6 . Clustering methods are 
unsupervised learning algorithms that try to structure unlabelled 
data points into different groups based on their arrangement in the 
input space. In this case, data points are composed of indicators 
excluding those ones related to group and performance. The 
proposal consists of running these methods to try to find groups 
based on the features used to evaluate candidates. If the method is 
capable of discovering protected groups in this unsupervised 
manner, this means that one or more features, such as weight or hair 
colour, are correlated with the categorical variable so that learning 
algorithms could potentially use these features to learn to 
discriminate.  If this is the case, the input data will be examined to 
identify and remove such correlated features.  
 
The second strategy consists of modifying the learning algorithm 
to account for fairness. In machine learning, the objective function 
is a mathematical expression of how well the model is fitted to the 
data. It guides the learning algorithms in the process of learning 
from data and creating data transformations that contribute to 
improving accuracy. The patent [29] proposes to replace the 
objective function, typically a global sum of squared errors, with a 
corrected function that sums the separate error of the model for each 
protected group. By doing so, the objective function incorporates a 
fairness constraint that will indirectly introduce pressure on the 
learning algorithm to build a model that considerers that the 
accuracy of the model with respect to all the protected groups (race, 
gender, age, etc.) must be equal. To account for the equal influence 
of underrepresented or minority classes, each group error term is 
normalized to ensure that the majority class does not influence the 
model more than the rest of the classes. The general expression for 
corrected error can be written as:  𝐸#$%%&#'&( = 𝐸* + 𝐸, + 𝐸- +	⋯ 
 
where EA, EB, etc. are the errors for each protected group. 
 
Additionally, the patent proposes to sum a penalty term to the 
corrected error to account for the regulations such as the EEOC. An 
example term of the 4/5ths rule can be represented as follows:  𝑃(𝑋) = 4𝑝6, 𝑖𝑓	𝑓(𝑋)	𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠	4/5𝑡ℎ𝑠	𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
 
where pm is the cost the user want to associate with the rule 
violation and 𝑓(𝑋) refers to the candidate evaluation model whose 
output will be checked for demographic parity. Therefore, the 
objective error function becomes:  𝐸IJ'K_M&NOP'Q = 𝐸#$%%&#'&( + 𝑃(𝑋) 
 
4  https://www.hirevue.com/blog/hirevue-assessments-and-preventing-algorithmic-
bias 
5 HireVue does not specify how this correlation can be discovered. 
6 Here we refer to as feature space to input data that consist of features extracted from 
candidates.    
3.3 Applied 
Applied7 is a hiring platform specialised in promoting diversity and 
inclusion in recruitment. The system includes a numerical, 
analytical and problem-solving testing platform called Mapped8 
that designs the tests by excluding patterns that are found to 
negatively impact on different demographic groups and improve 
pass rates of candidates of different groups9.  
 
In contrast to Pymetrics and HireVue, it performs bias discovery 
and mitigation by providing a de-biasing guide and demographic 
analytics reports for the hiring pipeline [7]. For example, regarding 
advertisement, the platform can analyse gendered language use and 
inclusiveness of position descriptions (see Figure 2). To ‘remove 
bias’ in the rest of the steps, the platform collects demographic 
information and then performs candidate anonymization and 
removes direct and indirect group information. Applied 
recommends to chunk assessment tests and compare results across 
candidates rather than performing full reviews of applications. In 
addition, it suggests to randomise the order of the chunks and get 
more than one persorn to score each chunk. Rather than performing 
formal statistical tests, the platform provides aggregated analytics 
to evaluate the whole process to visually detect biases at different 
stages (see Figure 3). Other comparison analytics are chunk scoring 
for each group or the degree of scoring agreement between multiple 
reviewers. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Example of gendered language and inclusion analysis 
of Applied. Generated with trial version available at 
7 https://www.beapplied.com   
8 http://www.get-mapped.com/  
9 http://www.get-mapped.com/#about  
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https://textanalysis.beapplied.com/ and an academic job ad of 
a British university. 
 
Figure 3 Visual auditing of bias implemented by Applied. 
Source [7]. 
 
4. Evaluating claims of bias mitigation 
 
Having outlined the different claims and approaches that our three 
AHSs under study provide for mitigating bias in hiring we now 
draw on FAT-related debates to briefly sketch some of the 
limitations of such approaches.  
 
With different levels of formalization, the three AHSs understand 
fairness in the broader categories identified in recent literature [15]: 
(1) anti-classification, the omission of group variable and proxies 
in the decision making model, also known as debiasing; (2) 
classification parity in terms of equal passing rates; and (3) 
calibration, the requirement that outcomes are independent of the 
group variables. Notice that all the categories depend on clear 
definitions of groups. Examples of definitions are binary gender, 
ethnic group (using definitions informed specifically by US 
demographics) and age interval. Social class or disabilities are not 
found neither in the examples nor in validation tests. (2) and (3) 
depend on the comparison of an outcome that is ultimately the 
selection of candidates, i.e. passing rates, but also candidate 
scoring. HireVue and Pymetrics audit bias by checking the 4/5ths 
rule (classification parity). Additionally, Pymetrics uses statistical 
tests to compare group scores and passing rates which are a 
common way of comparing groups represented by samples.  
 
In line with on-going discussions on criteria for fairness in data 
systems, notions of bias mitigation in AHSs present some inherent 
limitations [11,37].  One fundamental limitation is that reference 
data is, by definition, extracted from current and past employees, 
and in many cases from the ‘best performing’ ones. Regardless of 
attention to ‘fairness’, the algorithmic specification of ‘best 
performing’ or its close association best ‘fit’, can itself become a 
vehicle for bias [2]. Within this setting, it is not clear that fair 
evaluation methods can be built on past data that reflect historical 
injustices [11,37]. In other words, the issue with bias in AHSs may 
be in the very logic of prediction itself. Related to this, if the data 
used to build and validate the models only incorporates data from 
employees in the company and not the  rejected candidates, this 
limits the use of fairness metrics that consider that discrimination 
can be better reflected when accounting for disparate mistreatment 
[52], for example by comparing false negative cases, i.e., 
candidates that would be suitable employees and were wrongly 
rejected. Validating fairness with respect to passing rates (disparate 
impact), as in true positives, has been discussed as problematic 
since it represents the degree of belief we have in the model 
prediction with respect to an individual or group rather than a 
measure of discrimination [23]. Hellman [23] proposes to compare 
error ratios instead as a better measure to compare different 
treatment of groups, which opens up a complex discussion about 
the validity of metrics to compare groups .  
 
Discrimination with respect to different attributes is partially 
covered in the frameworks outlined by the three AHSs under study.  
Yet, as is a common feature of bias mitigation, they appear limited 
to single-axis understandings of identification that neglects 
substantial engagement with intersectional forms of discrimination 
[25]. Pymetrics validates fairness of each assessment test by 
performing multiple group comparisons across each attribute, e.g. 
comparing its determined racial groups scorings. Multiple axes of 
group identification are not directly compared, e.g. hispanic women 
with white men. HireVue, meanwhile, proposes in its patent to 
create a model that mitigates discrimination by modifying a 
standard objective function to equally account for the prediction 
errors of all the groups and also to penalize solutions that violate 
the classification parity constraint. However, this proposal is 
abstract and with no validation reports making it difficult to 
analyse. Moreover, the idea of adding a set of penalty terms to the 
objective function does not necessarily generate useful models. The 
problem arises in the fact that adding many terms to these functions 
will decrease the influence of each term, causing convergence 
problems in the learning algorithm. Indeed, the study of 
intersectionality and rich subgroups fairness in ML remains limited 
and in an early stage because of the problem of multiple objectives 
optimization and the complexity of expressing the concept of 
intersectionality in a mathematical way [9,12,27,52]. In this, 
understandings of bias mitigation in AHSs tend to overlook 
established limits of dominant antidiscrimination discourses that 
have also featured in legal debates [25].  
 
These computational limitations of bias mitigation in AHSs point 
to several directions that such efforts might take. However, none of 
these discussions take account of the different national contexts in 
which these systems are being deployed, and how different legal 
frameworks might apply. In order to illustrate the significance of 
this,  we now turn to outlining the relevant legal framework for the 
deployment of such systems in a UK context where we know they 
Insert Your Title Here ACM FAT* 2020, January, 2020, Barcelona, Spain 
 
 
are used, and how the approaches to bias mitigation they propose 
relate. 
 
5. Legal framework 
 
Raghavan et al’s [37] comprehensive study of automated hiring 
systems (AHSs) makes it clear that the majority of  such systems 
on the market are developed in the US. Exceptions include Applied 
and Thrivemap (both UK), Teamscope (Estonia) and ActiView 
(Israel). No rigorous evidence seems to be available as to the 
market share of systems in actual use across the globe, yet in terms 
of bias mitigation, where the system is developed is crucial. While 
hiring goals and values may be universal (itself questionable), legal 
regulation of data-driven automated systems is decidedly not. As 
outlined above, considerations of bias and its mitigation in US-built 
systems – such as Pymetrics and HireView - have clearly aimed at 
meeting the constraints of US equality law [10], notably the 
“4/5ths” rule set by the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) [46]. Yet  UK law (itself heavily permeated by EU law) on 
equality and discrimination in employment matters is considerably 
different; most obviously in the UK there is no “4/5ths” rule and 
hard statistical goals to (dis)prove bias do not seem formally to 
exist, in either statute or case law. It is noticeable that the two US-
originated systems make use of the 4/5ths rule while the UK system 
discussed (Applied) does not. Interestingly, also, another UK 
system used widely, Thrive Map makes no claims as to bias 
mitigation at all and is therefore not included in this paper.  
 
Furthermore, EU DP law, now codified and reformed in the GDPR, 
provides a suite of rights to “data subjects” (natural persons whose 
personal data is processed) which are unknown to Federal US law 
(although sectoral data rights do exist in the US in health, finance 
and some other domains, and significant state laws have been 
enacted eg the Californian Consumer Privacy Act 2018, which 
replicates many features of EU DP law). DP rights may prove in 
the UK/EU context to be as or more important in uncovering or 
combating bias than sectoral employment or equality rights; yet US 
systems may (unsurprisingly) not be optimised to meet these rights.  
 
Turning first to UK discrimination law, similarly to US law, it is 
based initially on the idea of a closed list of “protected 
characteristics”, here laid out in the Equality Act 2010, s 4. UK law 
also however (currently - Brexit may change this) has to respect 
supranational EU law, which includes a number of Directives 
relevant to equality and bias, notably the Equal Opportunities and 
Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC, the Gender Equality 
Directive 2004/113/EC and the Framework Directive for Equal 
Treatment in Employment and Occupation 2000/78/EC. Human 
rights standards under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) are also relevant and refers to broader protection against 
discrimination on any ground (art 14) in relation to the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR. The EU itself now has as a 
binding source of law its own human rights instrument, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU [55], albeit the UK currently has 
a limited “opt-out”. This complex legislative patchwork, divided 
across common law and civilian approaches to law-making and 
interpretation [28], possibly contributes to fewer “hard and fast” 
standards for measuring unlawful bias in UK employment law than 
in the US, which itself arguably makes the task of proving 
debiasing harder for builders of AHSs for the UK market and may 
have contributed to abandoning the effort altogether for some 
companies. 
 
The UK’s Equality Act 2010 attempts to replace a number of 
piecemeal prior laws relating to different types of inequality with a 
coherent statute covering inter alia sex, race and disability 
discrimination. Rather as with US law, discrimination can be direct 
or indirect. Direct discrimination in employment is nowadays 
regarded as rare [41]. Indirect discrimination is defined in s 19(1) 
as “a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in 
relation to a protected characteristic”. Effectively it occurs when a 
policy that applies in the same way to everybody has an effect that 
particularly disadvantages people with a protected characteristic. 
This is similar to the US idea of disparate impact. However the 
Code of Practice which accompanies the Equality Act [53] does not 
lay down a statistical rule of thumb akin to the 4/5ths rule to prove 
bias. Instead, reflecting s 19(2), the Code provides only that a 
comparison must be made between workers with the protected 
characteristic and those without it. The circumstances of the two 
groups must be sufficiently similar for a comparison to be made 
and there must be no material differences in circumstances (para 
4.15). This “pool for comparison” consists of the group which the 
provision, criterion or practice affects (or would affect) either 
positively or negatively, while excluding workers who are not 
affected by it, either positively or negatively. Importantly, the 
guidance does not always  require a formal comparative exercise 
using statistical evidence. Such an approach was however adopted 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to prove 
indirect sex discrimination in R v Secretary for State for 
Employment es parte Seymour-Smith  [2000] IRLR 263 and is 
endorsed in some cases by the Equality Act Code for the UK  as 
below (para 4.21): 
 
“• What proportion of the pool has the particular 
protected characteristic? 
• Within the pool, does the provision, criterion or practice 
affect workers 
without the protected characteristic? 
• How many of these workers are (or would be) 
disadvantaged by it? 
How is this expressed as a proportion (‘x’)? 
• Within the pool, how does the provision, criterion or 
practice affect 
people who share the protected characteristic? 
• How many of these workers are (or would be) put at a 
disadvantage by it? 
How is this expressed as a proportion (‘y’)? 
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Using this approach, the Employment Tribunal will then 
compare (x) with (y).” 
 
However there is no particular prescribed ratio of outcomes that 
proves bias. “Whether a difference is significant will depend on the 
context, such as the size of the pool and the numbers behind the 
proportions. It is not necessary to show that the majority of those 
within the pool who share the protected characteristic are placed at 
a “disadvantage” (para 4.22). Furthermore according to s 19(2), 
bias can be justified if it is shown to be a “proportionate” means of 
achieving a “legitimate” aim. Legitimacy is not even defined in the 
2010 Act though guidance can be drawn from the CJEU and the 
Code of Practice, which states that the aim of the discriminatory 
provision, criterion or practice “should be legal, should not be 
discriminatory in itself, and must represent a real, objective 
consideration”. It adds: “Although reasonable business needs and 
economic efficiency may be legitimate aims, an employer solely 
aiming to reduce costs cannot expect to satisfy the test” (para 4.29). 
Given this kind of language, it is hard to imagine how either 
proportionality or legitimacy could be coded into a hiring tool. 
 
Turning to DP law, all data subjects have a number of rights in 
relation to processing of personal data (itself defined in GDPR, art 
4(1)), including rights to transparency and access to data held about 
them (“subject access rights” or SARs)(GDPR, arts 12-15)  and to 
object to decisions which have legal or similarly significant effects 
being made about them using their personal data and by solely 
automated means (GDPR, art 22). The latter provision caused great 
academic stir in 2016 when it was claimed somewhat 
controversially it could be interpreted to provide data subjects, not 
just with a right to a “human in the loop” as had been known to be 
the case  (albeit with little publicity) since 1995, but also with a 
“right to an explanation” of how the decision was made [17,22,49]. 
Given the importance of access to employment, automated hiring 
systems almost certainly make a decision which has legal or 
significant effect. Indeed, the Information Commissioner’s Office 
(ICO), which regulates DP in the UK, gives “e-recruiting practices 
without human intervention” as a canonical example for the 
application of art 2210. 
 
Thus it could be argued that any use of a fully automated AHS, 
regardless of whether bias can be proved or is , indeed,  said to have 
been mitigated, can be refused by the prospective employee on the 
ground that it is a solely automated decision under art 22,  requiring 
explicit consent (art 22(2)(c)) and instead, the candidate could ask 
for a human to make that decision instead, or reconsider it. This 
rule is augmented further by the fact that it may be impossible to 
give valid explicit consent in the context of  employment anyhow. 
Consent under the GDPR art 4(11) must be “freely given” and the 
Art 29 Working Party (A29 WP - now replaced by the European 
Data Protection Board or EDPB) who provide persuasive guidance 
 
10  See ICO guidance on the GDPR and DPA 2018 at https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-
regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-
including-profiling/,  
on the GDPR, have indicated that truly free, and therefore valid, 
consent can probably never be given in the context of employment 
relations [57]. Of course it could be argued that a hiring (though not 
a firing or promotion/demotion) system precedes employment, and 
consent can therefore be valid; it seems unlikely the CJEU would 
take kindly to this, especially in times of austerity and precarity.  
Thus by chain of deduction it seems plausible that it is in fact illegal 
to use a solely automated AHS in the EU.  
 
Issues arise with this analysis however. First, anecodotally, very 
few hiring (or even firing, promotion, demotion, allocation of 
hours, etc) decisions seem to be taken without any human 
intervention at all.  To take a recent US example, Amazon came 
under fire in April 2019 for apparently automatedly sacking up to 
10% a year of their employees whose productivity fell below 
certain measured efficiency levels in environments regarded as 
highly datified [30]. However later evidence emerged that no 
“automatic” sackings in fact occurred and a human supervisor was 
always there to reverse the sacking. Thus art 22 would arguably not 
have applied. Uber’s global driver terms and conditions state that 
automated firings can take place  but then add that in EU a right to 
object to a human is available [58]. This suggests however that 
mere rubber stamping by a manager with no real intervention into 
decion making might be sufficient to render art 22 nugatory. What 
constitutes “enough” interaction by a human such that art 22 is not 
triggered, remains an unclear issue in the GDPR, and may vary 
from member state to member state (see [47,57]).  Secondly, art 22 
does not require consent from the data subject if the decision is 
“necessary for entering into or performance of a contract between 
an organisation and the individual” (art 22 (1)(a)) 11 . Could 
submission to an AHS ever be “necessary” for entering the contract 
of employment? It seems prima facie unlikely but an employer 
might argue eg triage when many 1000s of applications are 
received does not just benefit from but actually requires solely 
automated systems. 
 
If the right to object under art 22 is excluded by the lack of a “solely 
automated” decision, then any “right to an explanation” read from 
art 22 may also fall. However it is possible, though also 
controversial, that such a right may then be derived from art 15(h) 
which provides that users have a right to  information about “ the 
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling” (so 
the use of an AHS in hiring has to be notified to candidates) and “at 
least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic 
involved” [47]. It can be argued that the use of the phrase “at least” 
means that semi-automated decision making may not exclude the 
right to “meaningful information” [47]. Again such a right need not 
be chained to proof of bias, or failure to mitigate bias, and yet could 
prove highly effective in exposing discriminatory or even simply 
arbitrary or erroneous practices, at an individual and possibly even 
at a group level , given the possibility for collective redress actions 
11 A second exemption relates to where the decision is authorised by  member state or 
EU law.This refers to governmental “ public tasks”  and it seems unlikely it could ever 
apply to an AHS. 
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within the GDPR (see arts 80 and 82). Thus at this point an easier 
route to disincentivising bias in AHSs might, in the EU context, be 
seen as coming via DP rather than equality rights - especially given 
the probable difficulty of building in bias mitigation into AHSs 
definitively capable of meeting EU legal standards. It is also worth 
noting here that any machine learning system is likely to be 
regarded as “high risk” processing requiring a prior Data Protection 
Impact Assessment (DPIA) (see art 35(3)(a), which should show 
inter alia that potential for unfairness and bias had been considered 
and steps taken to avert. This might arguably be seen as implying a 
requirement for debiasing in AHS tools deployed in EU (see also 
[3] for a similar point in a US context).  
 
However, even if a right to algorithmic transparency does exist in 
the solely-automated hiring context, what does it practically mean? 
This has again been the subject of much academic debate. Selbst 
and Powles argue, for example, that for a right to “meaningful 
information about the logic involved” to be (sic) meaningful, it 
must be more than a simple regurgitation of source code [43].  The 
A29 Working Party recommend that the data subject should be 
provided with “general information (notably, on factors taken into 
account for the decision-making process, and on their respective 
‘weight’ on an aggregate level) which is also useful for him or her 
to challenge the decision” [13, at ]. To date there has been no 
relevant case law in the UK and the provision is not expanded on 
in the Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 which implements the 
GDPR in the UK (in comparison to some other member states such 
as France).  
6. Discussion 
The computational and legal challenges of AHSs that we have 
outlined here raise significant concerns for tackling discrimination 
and providing transparency to enable challenges to AHS hiring 
decisions in the context of the UK. This is particularly pertinent as 
bias mitigation in hiring is one of the key selling points for several 
of these tools. Whilst a few of the companies developing AHSs 
provide some documentation to evidence such claims, access to 
relevant information remains a key problem for conducting any 
thorough analysis. Claims and validation are often vague and 
abstract, if they are provided at all. Moreover, it is not clear how 
relevant stakeholders, not least job seekers, are able to access and 
understand information about how decisions about their eligibility 
might have been reached through AHSs. This makes it difficult to 
assess if and how discriminatory practices might have been part of 
the hiring process, and leaves little room for anyone to challenge 
the decision made. Given the transparency rights attributed to data 
subjects by the GDPR, this haziness as to transparency is 
unacceptable in the EU and UK. On the other hand, what approach 
to transparency is required by EU  law, remains itself vague. It 
would be good to see AHSs built in, or sold into the EU market 
meeting this challenge of “meaningful information” explicitly. 
Might it take the form of the counterfactual explanations which 
have become fashionable but actually offer little by way of practical 
remedies? [50] What if  vendors say that greater transparency is 
simply not possible? Again we may be back at a conclusion that 
such systems simply cannot be lawful in the EU.   
 
The AHSs we have looked at in this paper are relatively unique in 
providing some information about their workings, even if the exact 
data sources and model remain obscure and will vary according to 
different clients. In particular, in seeking to explicitly tackle issues 
of discrimination in hiring practices, these systems provide some 
insights into how such issues are understood and approached by 
AHSs. This is significant, and welcomed, as it provides an 
opportunity to engage with what could be considered as emerging 
standards in managerial techniques that are being exported to a 
global marketplace.   
 
Whilst a desire to address the prevalence of bias and discrimination 
in hiring is a significant pursuit (not least in the context of the UK 
where levels of discrimination against ethnic minorities in 
accessing jobs have remained relatively unchanged since the 1960s 
REF), the approaches to bias mitigation provided by the three 
AHSs we have looked at come with important limitations. First, 
attempts at mitigation within AHSs run into on-going concerns 
with computational fairness. These relate not only to the inherent 
problems with data-driven predictions and with relying on 
quantification for determining criteria of ‘good’ or appropriate ‘fit’, 
but also to the necessary reductionist nature of group identification 
in computational systems and the neglect of intersectionality that 
have also been the subject of significant criticism in legal 
understandings of discrimination.  
 
Secondly, attempts at bias mitigation in AHSs within a UK context  
also show problems with accountability. When such technologies 
are used for decision-making, to whom are the companies making 
AHSs responsible? The employer or the candidate?  The employer 
might argue that some types of transparency are sometimes 
undesirable, as indeed might the software company defending its 
intellectual property. Thus, the question is whose job it is to fulfil 
the obligation of transparency; the system builder, the employer 
who utilises it, or another actor altogether.   
 
Connectedly , the transfer of AHSs developed within a US socio-
legal context to a UK (and arguably EU) context introduces a 
number of fundamental legal problems of fit, not just with regards 
to discrimination and equality law, but as we have argued, perhaps 
more significantly in relation to DP law.  GDPR transparency rights 
in arts 15 and 22 may provide avenues to overturn aspects of the 
candidate-employer information asymmetry and might even 
outright prohibit the  use of AHSs for wholly automated decision-
making in hiring. Yet these rights may be ignored or ill-
implemented in systems not built within the EU. 
 
A number of other points might be addressed in future work. US 
literature on bias, especially racial bias, in the algorithmic 
workplace focuses on hiring because the US in general has “at will” 
firing with few legal constraints [4]. In Europe and in the UK 
specifically things are very different and a quick survey of 
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Employmet Appeal tribunal cases shows most revolve around 
firing or issues of in-work conditions. There is a real need in 
extending FAT work on algorithmic bias in the workplace to 
Europe to consider these other loci for datification, bias and 
opacity. Furthermore, more work is needed looking specifically at 
systems developed in the UK and the EU that also connects these 
to the actual practices and experiences of employers and candidates 
to get a sense of how AHSs shape those interactions. Such work 
requires more qualitative research that we seek to pursue in future 
project work.  
 
In conclusion, the lack of information about how AHSs work, the 
approach they take to tackling discriminatory hiring practices, and 
crucially, where and how they are used around the world is 
therefore a significant problem. Given it is not even clear that AHSs 
provide significant benefits to employers [13], it could even be 
asked if their use should actually be restricted or discouraged by 
regulators from the EU data protection and equality sectors. As this 
trend is set to become more pervasive, there is an urgent need to 
assess if and how AHSs should be used so as to uphold fundamental 
rights and protect workers’ interests.   
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